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ABSTRACT:  
Many democratic and jurisprudential theorists have too often uncritically accepted 
Alexander Bickel's notion of "the countermajoritarian difficulty" when considering the 
relationship between judicial review and democracy; this is the case for arguments both 
for and against judicial review. This framework is both theoretically and empirically 
unsustainable. Democracy is not wholly synonymous with majoritarianism, and judicial 
review is not inherently countermajoritarian in the first place. In modern democratic 
political systems, judicial review is one of many potential veto points. Since all modern 
democratic political systems contain veto points, the relevant and unexplored question is 
what qualities might make a veto point relatively democratic. Proceeding on the 
assumption that democracy's primary normative value is found in its opposition to 
domination by both state and private actors, we make a preliminary effort to delineate 
what qualities a democratic veto point might have, identifying five criteria, and evaluate 
judicial review using these criteria. We conclude that judicial review's performance 
against these criteria is decidedly mixed, but in the final balance is likely to be a modest 
net positive for democracy, particularly when compared to other veto points commonly 
found in contemporary democratic political systems. 
 
Introduction 
For half a century, following the publication of Alexander Bickel’s landmark 
study The Least Dangerous Branch, defenders and critics of judicial review have shared 
the view that judicial review presents a particular challenge for democratic theory. On 
this account, the countermajoritarian character of constitutional judicial review marks it 
as “deviant” within democratic political systems, requiring extra scrutiny and 
justification.
1
 This approach, known as the “countermajoritarian difficulty,” is becoming 
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increasingly untenable.
2
 Courts are not reliably countermajoritarian, nor are legislatures 
reliably majoritarian.
3
 The establishment and exercise of judicial review frequently 
entails collaboration between the judicial and elected political branches, as opposed to a 
zero-sum struggle for power.
4
 Furthermore, democracy (in theory and practice) has 
always consisted of a good deal more than simple majoritarianism.
5
 And, indeed, few 
scholars who evaluate judicial review from the standpoint of the countermajoritarian 
difficulty would seriously argue otherwise. A more sophisticated assessment of judicial 
review’s role in a democratic state requires a more viable conception of what sort of 
institutional arrangements might be considered democratic. Some scholars have 
attempted to analyze judicial review from the standpoint of deliberative democracy.
6
 
Others have argued that the “democracy-against-domination” approach seen in the works 
of Ian Shapiro, Phillip Pettit, and others is a useful approach for evaluating the 
democratic valence of judicial review.
7
 We will consider judicial review from the latter 
perspective, but depart from previous efforts by focusing on judicial review’s non-
exceptional character. 
 Both a key distorting effect of the countermajoritarian difficulty framework and a 
more promising way forward are identified in Barry Friedman’s history of the importance 
of the countermajoritarian difficulty within legal scholarship: 
[T]here is an interesting question of political theory concerning how judicial 
review fits into the fabric of majoritarian democracy, but . . . this is not what most 
constitutional theorists address either. The theorist truly devoted to problems of 
democratic theory would want to examine each and every institution of 
democratic governance on this basis, from the least representative - such as the 
Federal Reserve Board, or independent administrative agencies, or the Senate for 
that matter - to the seemingly most representative, such as the House of 
Representatives. Constitutional theorists rarely address these institutions or devote 
any sustained attention to the real questions of political theory they present . . . the 
academic tradition examined here is court-obsessed.
8
 
3 
 
Friedman is right to emphasize that assessments of judicial review’s democratic 
legitimacy are meaningful only in the proper comparative institutional context. All liberal 
democracies diffuse power among numerous institutions and scores of actors, and (since 
all of these institutions have some measure of autonomy from public control and none of 
these institutions operate without constraint) these institutions in practice cannot easily be 
sorted into “majoritarian” and “countermajoritarian” categories. Judicial review’s status 
as a veto point tells us little about its democratic legitimacy.  
 Assessing judicial review as practiced from a democratic perspective will not be 
easy. The judicial power to nullify acts of elected branches cannot be assumed to have the 
same democratic effects operating within a highly centralized Westminster system that it 
has in a decentralized, veto point-laden Madisonian system. Nor will judges applying an 
eighteenth-century constitutional text within nineteenth-century constitutional norms 
have the same political effects as judges applying twentieth-century texts within twenty-
first-century constitutional norms. Of course, this is true of other veto points in 
democratic systems as well—their function within the overall democratic system varies 
substantially, depending on numerous features of that system’s institutional structure and 
prevailing norms. 
 In other words, determining the democratic status of all veto points as a general 
matter is doomed to fail. But asserting that nothing can be said about the democratic 
properties of a particular veto point without access to all the particulars of a given context 
is unsatisfying as well. Therefore, we adopt a middle-ground strategy here—we will 
consider the veto point of judicial review in an explicitly comparative context. More 
specifically, we will examine how a democracy-against-domination approach might 
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evaluate courts as one of many veto points. We proceed as follows:  First, we examine 
the arguments of those who critique judicial review on the terms of the 
countermajoritarian difficulty, identifying ways in which they are led astray by their 
treatment of judicial review as a unique veto point. We then identify five criteria on 
which the democratic value of veto points might be measured, from a democracy-against-
domination perspective, and briefly consider the relative likely value of judicial review 
on these grounds. Judicial review seems to hold up relatively well compared to other 
common veto points in contemporary democratic systems—whatever its democratic 
shortcomings, they are no greater, and possibly less worrisome, than other veto points, 
such as the filibuster and bicameralism. 
 
Judicial Review in Contemporary Democratic Theory 
Judicial review’s democratic standing has been the subject of sustained theoretical 
attention in recent years, and Jeremy Waldron is one of judicial review’s most important 
democratic critics. His approach to democratic theory is broadly consistent with the 
countermajoritarian difficulty hypothesis. His recent work contains both a sustained 
defense of the democratic content of legislative processes and outcomes as well as a 
sustained critique of judicial review on both countermajoritarian and consequentialist 
grounds. Waldron’s appreciation for the ‘majority-procedure’ feature of legislative action 
is based on what he takes to be the normative point of democracy—which is to give equal 
respect to persons under conditions of persistent disagreement.
9
 While Waldron concedes 
that equal respect doesn’t logically or necessarily require majority-procedure, he does 
suggest that such a procedure is warranted given that “the problems we face pose 
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themselves urgently for us in the circumstances of politics, and in particular in the 
circumstance of disagreement about what would be just, a moral or at any rate an 
appropriate solution.”10 He is skeptical that any substantive requirement of political 
equality can be removed from the procedural requirements of majority rule, as even if 
political equality is a widely shared goal, disagreement will quickly reemerge when we 
try to determine the substantive meaning of political equality. 
 What does this all mean for judicial review? It begins at a democratic 
disadvantage for Waldron because courts do not, like legislatures, “internalize those 
disagreements [about social justice in society] by building them into the institutional 
structure of our assembly (with arrangements like government benches and opposition 
benches, majority and minority parties, debates, rules of order, whips, and roll-calls), 
indeed by making them part of our law-making.”11 But here Waldron incorporates some 
potentially countermajoritarian features of legislatures into his democratic theory by 
suggesting that they represent the importation of the specific nature of a particular 
society’s disagreements about social justice.12 The crux of his critique of judicial review 
is that the liberal fears commonly associated with majority rule without judicial review—
specifically, fears about a Madisonian “tyranny of the majority”—are not unique to 
legislative supremacy. A form of tyranny is possible regardless of the details of the final 
moment in decision-making.
13
 Therefore, legislative supremacy is superior to a system of 
constitutional judicial review for two reasons, one philosophical and one pragmatic. The 
philosophical reason is that it is the decision-rule most clearly consistent with equal 
respect.
14
 The pragmatic reason is that Waldron suspects that judicial review will do no 
better at protecting the rights of minorities than legislative supremacy.
15
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 The latter claim is, of course, highly contingent. Waldron correctly and 
appropriately notes many moments in American constitutional history when the Supreme 
Court has notably failed to protect minority rights. We agree with Waldron that judicial 
review isn’t inherently necessary for liberal democracy,16 nor is it a universally reliable 
and effective protector of vulnerable and unpopular minorities. Furthermore, we agree 
that judicial review would likely be an ineffective barrier against emergent tyranny.
17
 But 
contingent empirical examples cut both ways. The structure and rules of legislatures 
cannot be counted on to efficiently and effectively translate majority political preferences 
into legislative outcomes, and courts may at times do a better job of doing exactly that. 
So barring a more systematic approach to empirical matters, the 
empirical/consequentialist element of this dispute cannot be resolved in a satisfying 
manner.  
 What of Waldron’s philosophical account of the normative desirability of 
legislative supremacy? Waldron contends that the normative point of democracy is equal 
respect. But as Christopher Eisgruber notes, “majority rule” is but one possible 
interpretation of the procedural manifestation of equal respect.
18
 Furthermore, some of 
the reasons Waldron gives for preferring majoritarian decision-making (in particular, 
May’s theorem) do not appear to justify ceding power to representative institutions.19 
The core problem here is that Waldron conflates ordinary legislative procedure and 
majoritarian decision-making.
20
 Waldron asserts that “the people are entitled to govern 
themselves by their own judgments,”21 an entitlement that is extrapolated from the core 
right to political participation, which is inexorably linked to our reliance on our own 
judgments. Political participation, according to Waldron, occupies a special ontological 
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status amongst existing recognized human rights due not to any normative priority but 
because “participation is a right whose exercise seems peculiarly appropriate in situations 
where reasonable rights-bearers disagree about what rights they have.”22 But here the 
epistemic move from “the people” to legislative bodies and legislative supremacy in 
particular is made far too easily. For precisely the reasons Waldron wants to embrace 
majority rule, we must question fully conflating majority rule with democracy. 
Unsurprisingly, Waldron fails to make the case that majority rule is neutral, and later he 
backs off this claim altogether.
23
 Here Waldron’s insistence on taking disagreement 
seriously undermines his conclusions—reasonable disagreement about which dispersal of 
political powers best promotes equal respect for citizens is not hard to imagine. 
Waldron does not fully consider how judicial review functions within 
contemporary democracies, and in so doing both overestimates the autonomy of courts 
and underestimates the many ways in which the other branches are able to diffuse 
democratic responsibility. Waldron assumes that liberal democracies include 
“safeguards” such as “bicameralism, robust committee scrutiny, and multiple levels of 
consideration, debate and voting.”24 All of these features—in addition to other common 
features of modern democratic states, such as independent agencies in charge of 
monetary policy—frustrate majority will and dilute accountability. In the American 
political system, for example, the committee system and the structure and rules of the US 
Senate were much more important in preventing reforms to Jim Crow laws than the 
Supreme Court.
25
 Another example of the way in which his assumptions about relations 
between courts and legislatures is insufficiently complex can be seen in his discussion of 
Canada’s “notwithstanding clause,” which allows federal and provincial legislatures to 
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override judicial review by announcing their intention to deviate from the demands of the 
charter.
26
 Waldron correctly points out that “[in] practice, however, the notwithstanding 
clause is rarely invoked” and for that reason considers Canada’s regime of judicial review 
a form of “strong” review, like the US, for the purposes of his argument.27 The fact that 
legislatures who could override substantive constitutional rulings with a simple majority 
in a centralized Parliamentary system virtually never do so raises serious questions about 
Waldron’s assumptions that judicial review operates in a presumptively 
countermajoritarian and “undemocratic” fashion. The legislature must, according to 
Waldron, “misrepresent its position on rights” to use the notwithstanding clause, and is 
impaired by “the legislature is always somewhat at the mercy of the courts’ public 
declarations about the meaning of the society’s Bill or Charter of Rights.”28 But this is an 
empirical claim, and a strange one for someone with Waldron’s belief in the democratic 
legitimacy of legislatures to assume, unquestioningly, to be accurate. Why would the 
citizenry automatically side with an unelected court over an elected legislature in a 
conflict over the nature of rights? The fact that Canadian legislators disdain the use of 
powerful weapons to oppose the exercise of judicial review (as do American legislators, 
who rarely use the powerful tools given to them in Article III—including jurisdiction-
stripping and court packing) powerfully suggests that judicial review is both more 
normatively legitimate and more consistent with the general preferences of elected 
legislators than Waldron’s assumptions imply.29 And while the possibility that judicial 
review allows legislators to diffuse responsibility for difficult policy choices presents a 
serious challenge for democratic legitimacy, these problems are indistinguishable from 
the problems created by many other veto points.  
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Waldron fails to properly evaluate judicial review as one of many veto points in a 
democratic system. This error is a common one, dating back at least to Alexander 
Bickel’s influential formulation of judicial review as a “deviant” institution in American 
politics over fifty years ago.
30
 But legislative majorities may be thwarted at various points 
in the process, ranging from formal to informal.
31
 Waldron, when arguing against judicial 
review on behalf of “majority decision,” implies that veto points are never justifiable.32 
However, when arguing on behalf of “ordinary legislative procedure,” the various veto 
points embedded in both that procedure (as well as the enactment of legislative 
outcomes) are not directly discussed but seem to be assumed.
33
 
Waldron’s core error—his failure to evaluate judicial review in an institutional 
comparative context—it replicated by many other recent democratic critics of judicial 
review. Richard Bellamy’s republican case for political rather than legal 
constitutionalism contains an even stronger version of Waldron’s critique of judicial 
review, relying on a similar argument from the fact of disagreement as a central feature of 
the circumstances of politics.
34
 Throughout, he distinguishes between two kinds of 
decision-making procedures:  democratic and legal. The former are associated with 
majoritarianism; the latter, with countermajoritarianism. Because the latter elevate the 
views of some above others, they are not consistent with the value of political equality, 
and open the door for potential domination. The potential for veto points associated with 
legislative processes are not entirely ignored by Bellamy, but are downplayed relative to 
judicial veto points in large part because they are closer to the act of voting, which 
contains the requirements for a non-dominating procedure:  “Giving each and every 
citizen one (and only one) vote in a general election offers a rough and ready and easy 
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way to verify form of ensuring all citizens views carry the same weight in collective 
decision-making.”35  
This approach makes the same fundamental error as Waldron’s:  a number of veto 
points, particularly those found in the organization of the legislature, suggest the 
democratic side of political decision-making fails to live up to the standard suggested 
here. Beyond that, even at the moment of a democratic election, the standard of equality 
suggested here is rarely met. Bellamy correctly takes some of judicial review’s defenders 
to task for contrasting idealized exercises of judicial review with the flawed realities of 
legislative politics. But here he is guilty of a similar idealization of elections. Virtually all 
contemporary democracies feature some degree of malapportionment in one or more 
legislative bodies, which is persistent and generally favors some categories of voters 
(often rural voters) over others.
36
 As Adam Przeworski recently noted, “no rule of 
collective decision-making other than unanimity can render causal efficacy to equal 
individual participation.”37 So even at the procedural level, democratic elections as 
practiced don’t live up the standard Bellamy holds out for them, even before we consider 
the legislative veto points that will frustrate strong political equality after the election. 
There is no configuration of democratic politics that fully meets the procedural demands 
of political equality.  
Another important critique of judicial review has been developed by 
constitutional populists such as Larry Kramer
38
 and Mark Tushnet.
39
 Kramer’s popular 
constitutionalism can be placed in the context of progressive scholars using the tools of 
originalism to challenge the conclusions of conservative originalists.
40
 Kramer attempts 
to demonstrate with voluminous historical data that as generally understood at the time of 
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the framing, constitutional limits on the government were enforced through popular will, 
not by the courts. Certain limited forms of judicial review can be consistent with this 
understanding, but contemporary judicial supremacy is not. Ultimately, evaluations of 
judicial review must rest on pragmatic and consequentialist grounds rather than historical 
ones, and like Waldron, Kramer does not explain why judicial review (as opposed to 
other countermajoritarian veto points intended to impose limits on the state) is uniquely 
problematic. However, his point that “the people themselves” cannot be presumed to be 
incompetent to interpret the Constitution is an important one that should inform any 
evaluation of judicial review. 
Tushnet’s populist case against judicial review—even the relatively modest forms 
Kramer finds acceptable—is of significant potential interest in the context of comparing 
judicial review to other veto points. Tushnet advocates a populist constitutionalism that 
privileges the “thin constitution” (most notably, the broad abstractions of the preamble 
and the Declaration of Independence) over the “thick constitution” (the detailed 
distribution of power and establishment of procedures that dominates the first three 
Articles of the Constitution).
41
 Tushnet’s version of populist constitutionalism would 
seem to imply serious democratic problems with any veto points that interfere with 
popular sovereignty, since veto points are quintessentially “thick constitutional” devices. 
Given his focus on judicial review, however, Tushnet does not pursue a comparative 
analysis of thick constitutional veto points.    
One recent critic of judicial review, importantly, does not treat it as a uniquely 
problematic or deviant institution. In an important new book Melissa Schwartzberg 
considers (with particular attention to the process of constitutional amendment but 
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general democratic decision-making as well) the status of different veto points and 
procedural hurdles in both historical and analytic terms.
42
 She argues that veto points and 
procedural hurdles can be grouped into two categories:  those that straightforwardly and 
clearly lead to supermajority rules, and create the opportunity for minority veto power, 
and those that don’t appear to be in conflict with legislative majoritarianism. The latter 
don’t violate majoritarian rule but create “complex majoritarianism.”43 Examples of 
complex majoritarianism rules include popular referendums, requiring a second 
affirmative vote following the next election, and deliberative citizen assemblies of the 
sort used in British Columbia’s electoral reforms.44 Schwartzberg argues that a 
democratic system could plausibly be designed in such a way that the veto points of 
complex majoritarianism could replace supermajoritarian veto points, including judicial 
review, accomplishing whatever legitimate aims such rules might have with significantly 
fewer democratic costs. We have few substantive quarrels with this argument, and indeed 
find the constitutional vision she offers potentially attractive under the right conditions. 
Our differences with Schwartzberg primarily revolve around the level of analysis:  we 
wish to consider the democratic value of different veto points in the context of actually 
existing democratic institutions, which, without exception, contain countermajoritarian 
veto points, whereas Schwartzberg’s approach is more broadly systemic. In embracing 
the assumption that countermajoritarian veto points appear to be inevitable under the 
current conditions for democratic governance, we are not making a claim that they are 
conceptually or normatively necessary for democracy in a greater sense. Insofar as 
countermajoritarian veto points remain common, an analysis of their comparative value is 
useful even if there exists a strong independent case for complex majoritarianism. 
13 
 
 While we have focused our attention on judicial review’s critics here, we wish to 
briefly comment on a common strategy for defending judicial review that we reject, and 
explain why. The most common democratic defense of judicial review takes the form of 
what Peter Railton calls a “bulwark theory” of judicial review.45 What judicial review is 
said to provide a bulwark against varies, but the structure of such theories remains the 
same:  Majoritarian democracy is associated with a threat, and judicial review empowers 
judges to protect against that danger. The harm prevented by avoiding this danger 
outweighs whatever harm (if any) is done to democratic procedure by the exercise of a 
judicial veto point. Perhaps the most common form of bulwark theory concerns the 
possibility of democratically authorized rights violations against unpopular minorities or 
individuals.
46
 Other bulwark theories focus on the protection of democratic procedural 
rights,
47
 the proper boundaries of public reason for political discourse,
48
 and the proper 
balance between honoring democratic procedures and ensuring democratic outcomes.
49
  
The differences between bulwark theories are less important to us than their 
similar structure. As a justification for the granting of a specific institutionalized form of 
political power, they fall short. In our assessment of bulwark defenses of judicial review, 
we find ourselves in partial agreement with judicial review’s critics:  insofar as judicial 
review functions as a defense of minorities against majorities, it will often be the case 
that the minorities whose interests are protected will be those who need it least.
50
 This 
isn’t, however, in itself a reason to reject judicial review, but rather a reason to appreciate 
the dangers and flaws we must recognize in any institutional arrangement. Institutions 
cannot be justified solely by an account of how the persons who occupy them ought to 
ideally wield power. Any non-ideal defense of judicial review must start with the likely 
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effects of that particular institutionalization of power, recognizing that it may be occupied 
by flawed and untrustworthy characters. Judicial review can and will be exploited for 
undemocratic or illiberal purposes. No veto point or institutional arrangement can avoid 
this possibility, and all of them could avoid such outcomes if we could stipulate ideal 
behavior on the part of the relevant actors.  
 
Veto Points and Democratic Theory 
 What would a consideration of judicial review’s democratic status look like if we 
treated it as one possible veto point amongst many, rather than a uniquely deviant 
institution? This is the question to which we now turn. The literature on veto points in 
political systems has largely emerged from social and public choice theory, not normative 
democratic or legal theory.
51
 Before we can begin to consider judicial review’s 
democratic status, we must first consider what a democratic approach to veto points in 
general might look like. We will assume that some veto points are inevitable, even in the 
most majoritarian of democratic political systems, due largely to the size, scope, and 
complexity of modern politics. So what might render a veto point more or less 
democratic? How one answers this question will turn on the question of what one holds 
to be the normative point of democracy. As indicated earlier, we align our analysis here 
with an emerging school of thought propounding that democracy’s purpose is to avoid, 
prevent, lessen, or eradicate domination.
52
 This position holds that preventing domination 
by government officials through the threat of removal via election is a normatively 
valuable feature of democracy. But democracy-against-domination must also consider 
other sources of potential domination. Domination is not solely the purview of the state, 
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as private domination in various forms remains a routine feature of modern life even in 
liberal societies.  
While a full defense of this approach is beyond our scope here, a few points can 
be made. First, while only a handful of theorists have defined democracy in this way, 
opposition to domination is close to the heart of a number of different approaches to 
democracy, although they approach it in a variety of ways. For deliberativists, the rules, 
context, and requirements of proper deliberation are important in part because they 
prevent some democratic actors from dominating others in democratic decision-making. 
For agonists, a key task of democratic theories is to make sense of or discover 
possibilities for democratic action and agency for actors who are dominated, oppressed, 
or otherwise excluded. For liberal democrats, the limits of democracy (and, in some 
versions, institutional limits on it) are designed to prevent the majority from dominating 
the minority, whereas the practice of democracy more broadly is a tool to prevent 
domination of the citizens by the state. This approach should have broad appeal to many 
of those who adhere to other schools of democratic thought.  
Second, democracy-against-domination provides a distinctively valuable way of 
evaluating state action and institutions. Domination captures the fundamental danger of 
state power (that it can easily come to dominate the citizenry) while at the same time 
motivating the creation of a sufficiently powerful state to prevent citizens from 
dominating each other. A democracy-against-domination theory of the state thus becomes 
a balancing act—the state must be powerful enough to effectively thwart dominium when 
possible, but not so powerful that it evades the control of its citizens and risks slipping 
into imperium. In applying this democracy-against-domination theory to veto points as a 
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way of analyzing judicial review, we are following Michael Saward’s call to move 
democratic theory away from too great a focus on democratic principles and their precise 
application and toward identifying democratic devices which have the potential to 
activate and advance democratic principles.
53
 A veto point becomes a potential 
democratic device when it makes a contribution to either dominium prevention or 
imperium prevention, without heightening the danger of the other to an equal or greater 
degree. This democratic theory presents a clear picture of what we should want from 
democratic institutional arrangements above and beyond merely being representative or 
majoritarian.  
How can democracy-against-domination generate heuristics for comparative veto 
point evaluation? Pettit argues that democracy requires two dimensions:  authorial and 
editorial. The overall goal of both is to match policy with the common good (or, in 
Pettit’s terminology, “common avowable interests”), which should guide non-dominating 
governance. The authorial dimension of democratic politics is idea generation, and runs 
the risk of what Pettit calls “false positives”—ill-advised ideas that do not serve the 
public good or reduce domination.
54
 The editorial dimension of democracy, when 
functioning properly, eliminates these false positives through “scrutinize-and-disallow” 
mechanisms. Pettit’s conception of democracy is appealing, although it exaggerates the 
separation between these two parts of the democratic process. To the extent that veto 
points serve this editorial democratic function, they occur at many different stages of the 
process, sometimes early in the authorial stage. To the extent that democratic politics can 
be understood in terms of these two dimensions, they cannot be sorted out as cleanly and 
clearly as he suggests.
55
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 Nevertheless, we can hope that, in the best case, Pettit’s image of the editorial 
function is a good way to think of what veto points in democratic systems might, provide. 
At their worst, veto points thwart democratic majorities through the capricious whims or 
craven self-interest of powerful veto players—and no veto point is immune from 
potentially being used for this purpose. If we assume that veto points are inevitable, we 
should focus not on how to prevent them but on how to evaluate, shape, and reform them 
to serve democratic goals as well as possible. What characterizes veto points better suited 
to help prevent domination? We suggest five criteria for evaluating democratic veto 
points. This list is not intended to be exhaustive, and does not deny the existence of 
additional important criteria unrelated to the normative ends of democracy. (The 
complexity of the modern state, for example, inevitably includes committee systems 
where legislators can acquire and deploy at least some expertise over some areas of 
policy, whether or not committee systems tend to reduce domination.) Nonetheless, these 
categories can provide a useful guide to considering the democratic impact of various 
veto points. 
Criteria for Evaluating the Democratic Value of Veto Points 
First, requirements that veto players and their vetoes are public and justified to a 
public audience increase their legitimacy. Two closely related and central features of 
functional democratic systems are accountability and transparency. These are important 
values in both democracy’s majoritarian and non-majoritarian procedures. This is why, 
for example, most legislative bodies have rules that permit a minority of members to 
force a public, recorded vote count; in the United States, this is one of the few procedural 
rules written into the Constitution:  the “journal clause” of Article 1, sec. 5 empowers a 
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one-fifth minority to demand a publicly recorded vote.
56
 If the exercise of vetoes are 
effectively hidden from the public, some of the goals of democracy are less likely to be 
well served.
57
 The use of veto points to promote domination, rather than prevent it, are 
less likely to be effectively hidden from the citizenry, increasing their capacity to respond 
negatively to such efforts. If we are to authorize and allow a veto power, we should also 
demand justification and accountability from that exercise. This is consistent with the 
notion that majoritarianism is the default guiding principle of democratic decision-
making, and deviations from it should be done in a way that recognizes that status. The 
exercisers of veto point power will inevitably have wide discretion over its use, but that 
discretion should not be a cover to avoid the demand for public justification. A veto 
player should not be able to avoid criticism and public responsibility for an unpopular or 
controversial exercise of veto power. This is especially important given the iterated 
nature of political conflict. If the justification for the exercise of a veto is poor, there are 
numerous ways in which that veto player might conceivably be removed, or engaged to 
behave differently in a future situation. Under this criterion, the modern “stealth 
filibuster” (in which single senators can privately put “holds” on legislation or 
supermajority requirements are simply assumed) in the United States Senate would be 
more problematic than filibusters that at least require identifiable legislators or groups of 
legislators to delay the passage of legislation with majority support.
58
   
Secondly, veto points should, to the extent it is reasonably possible to do so, be 
separated from the direct, personal private interests of veto players.
59
 The goal of 
avoiding domination is not well-served when public institutions are easily subverted to 
private ends. This criteria should not be construed too broadly; we are not suggesting that 
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veto players (or any democratic actors) should be prohibited from legitimate political 
action on behalf of any cause where there might be an overlapping interest or goal—
indeed, to do so might be consistent with a particularly high-minded version of 
deliberative democracy, but would not at all be consistent with democracy-against-
domination. This criterion is meant narrowly and regards direct private gain accruing to 
the individual veto player or her immediate associates, not to a political or social 
movement or demographic group to which she might belong; the limitations on the latter 
cases are better covered by the previous criteria as well as criteria five. When such a 
separation is not possible, those private interests should be disclosed and justified. This is 
a particularly difficult goal when considering legislative committees as veto points, as 
legislators are likely to gain and maintain access to veto powers through committee 
membership on issues of particular interest to them. Nevertheless, limiting and exposing 
this connection is crucial to the separation of public and private interest. Limiting the 
extent to which narrow, private interests can hijack public processes is necessary for 
preventing democratic processes from becoming complicit in private domination. 
Whatever benefits veto points might attain for democracy, they are also opportunities for 
private interests to assert themselves in the democratic process. This should be lessened 
or prevented, to the extent that it can. 
Third, veto points should function not only to disallow “false positives” but 
should provide a forum for weighing priorities in a context of limited resources. Here the 
most important veto points in question are the committees in legislative bodies that 
control the budget, and the federal agencies that inevitably wield considerable power over 
which laws receive resources for enforcing. Priority-setting is a form of veto politics. A 
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good deal of legislation is irrelevant without authorized funding (authorized by budget 
legislation) and the will to enforce (by federal agencies and local governments). On the 
one hand, this is a banal fact of political life. Nevertheless, the organization of authority 
to exercise these powers can be done in more or less democratic ways. Domination exists 
to various degrees throughout the political, economic and social realm and democracy-
against-domination is not a perfectionist political theory. Weighing the importance of 
action based on the relative severity of instances of domination is central to this approach 
to democracy, and if veto points can be directed toward this crucial political task, it is to 
their credit. 
Fourth, veto points should facilitate public contestation of government decision 
and government action. Too often, the goal of public participation and influence is 
understood as valuable only at the level of idea generation. But, as Scheppele has argued, 
democracy takes place not merely during elections but between them as well.
60
 Veto 
points can be an avenue for public participation and input, especially in cases where 
ordinary legislative action has failed to reflect the priorities, needs, and will of the public 
for various reasons. More veto points can mean more agenda-setting loci that lessen the 
chances of particular groups being shut out of the process.
61
 This is particularly necessary 
from a democracy-against-domination standpoint, which recognizes the extent to which 
domination can arise in unintentional and unexpected ways. In Shapiro’s terms, just 
hierarchies have an unfortunate tendency to atrophy into relationships of domination.
62
 
Democratic veto points should create avenues for effective contestation for minority 
populations subject to domination to the extent they can, whether that domination is due 
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to malicious disregard in a part of the political process, indifference, or unintended 
consequence.   
And fifth, veto points are most valuable when they empower underrepresented 
minorities as opposed to minorities already well- or over- represented within the political 
system. While any democratic system will contain some countermajoritarian aspects, both 
majority rule and the desirability of responsibility and accountability mean that 
redundancy among multiple veto points is, all things being equal, problematic. If veto 
points reliably over-represent interests that already enjoy strong representation, their 
potential and actual democratic value is lessened considerably, as they become more 
likely to serve as a tool of domination rather than provide protection against it. If an 
increase in the diffusion of power within state institutions does not represent a more 
diffuse array of social forces, such veto points are likely to reinforce patterns of social 
domination rather than alleviating them. Evidently, this is a difficult standard:  virtually 
any institution is more likely than not to over-represent powerful interests. But the 
comparative effects of veto points in this respect are especially important in determining 
their democratic value. If veto points fail to substantially broaden representation and 
involvement in political decision-making, Waldron’s normative vision becomes much 
more attractive.    
To illustrate, let us return to the filibuster in the United States Senate, an 
institutional feature that is very difficult to defend from a democracy-against-domination 
perspective. In practice, the filibuster has tended to exacerbate social domination, and 
played a particularly dismal role in reinforcing white supremacy in the post-Civil War 
South, starting with the successful filibuster of legislation seeking to maintain black 
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access to the ballot in the late nineteenth century:  “Beginning during Reconstruction and 
continuing for nearly a century, anti-civil rights filibusters played a major role in 
blocking measures to prohibit lynching, poll taxes, and race discrimination in 
employment, housing, public accommodations, and voting.”63 The rule has never been 
used in a similarly systematic way to protect the interests of underrepresented groups. 
The filibuster can be expected to protect the interests of small, rural states—a potentially 
legitimate goal, common in large, diverse democracies.
64
 However, given that such 
groups are already greatly overrepresented in the composition of the Senate (which 
exercises a veto over executive and federal judicial appointments) and somewhat 
overrepresented in the House of Representatives and the Electoral College, it is difficult 
to argue that the filibuster is democratically legitimate. “The filibuster,” Binder and 
Smith conclude, “is used in ways that are hardly relevant to the nation’s welfare, in ways 
that undermine Senate effectiveness on legislative matters unrelated to the targeted 
measures.”65 On this criteria, the filibuster appears to be a particularly undemocratic veto 
point. 
But the filibuster, while it retains some defenders,
66
 is one of the most derided and 
least defended contemporary veto points from a democratic perspective. To consider a 
less obvious case:  bicameralism also functions as a veto point. Can it be democratically 
justified? While disavowing some examples of bicameralism, such as the profoundly 
unrepresentative US Senate, Waldron thinks so. The democratic value of bicameralism, 
for Waldron, comes from the potential value of difference, as long as the two legislative 
bodies are both generally majoritarian. Arguing against Bentham’s critique of 
bicameralism, Waldron suggests it may have added democratic value compared to a 
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unicameral system, assuming it is property designed.
67
 No system of representation is 
perfect:  
No matter how good we make the scheme of representation in a given chamber, 
no matter how many of our good thoughts about election, representation, and 
deliberation we have already taken on board, it is always possible to improve 
things by complementing that scheme of representation with another.
68
 
 
Different schemes of representation, on Waldron’s logic here, can capture different 
shades of majoritarian representation, which might complement each other in important 
ways. It is easy to imagine how this might work:  if a particular minority is spread out 
across districts evenly in a legislative body comprised of single-member districts and 
first-past-the-post elections, they might have little to no voice or power; if the second 
chamber were elected via proportional representation, that could enhance their political 
power and give them an important tool to resist domination. We agree with Waldron that 
a bicameral system could plausibly be designed to accomplish such an end, but the 
democratic benefits of such a proliferation of veto points must be weighed against the 
democratic costs. A second co-equal chamber doubles the intra-legislative veto points 
associated with committee hierarchies and procedural rules, doubling the opportunities 
for status quo bias. It doubles the changes of an electoral majority finding itself unable 
create a legislative majority due to the configuration of districts or the particulars of a 
scheme of representation. Whatever advantages bicameralism might have must be 
weighed against the costs that come with it, which is a significant enhancement of status-
quo bias, inhibiting government’s potential to enact policies that respond to private 
domination.
69
 While Waldron does identify some potential democratic benefits from 
bicameralism as a veto point, its status as a legislative veto point does not eradicate its 
democratic dangers. While the case for bicameralism as a democratic veto point is easier 
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to imagine than the filibuster, it is far from clear that its status as legislative and 
majoritarian is sufficient to declare it more democratic than judicial review on our 
criteria. 
Two final notes before we turn to evaluation of judicial review on the criteria 
presented here. First, we do not give much consideration to different models of judicial 
review:  strong vs. weak, review of legislative vs. executive action, standing rules for 
bringing a case to the court, and so on. In the real world, there is a great deal of variation 
in the organization of judicial review in different democratic systems, and this very likely 
matters when evaluating its democratic value.
70
 This issue is further complicated by 
context:  judicial view might also vary considerably in its democratic value depending on 
the institutional context in which it is embedded, as well as the political, legal, and 
cultural environment in which it is found. The best tools against domination are likely to 
vary considerably, depending on the nature of the most prominent local threats to non-
domination. So strong conclusions about judicial review’s democratic value in a 
particular democratic system are likely to be contingent both on the organization of the 
court and its powers and the larger institutional context in which it is embedded. The 
criteria here are the beginning, not the end, of the evaluation of judicial review as 
embedded in different political systems. 
Second, we focus on the comparative evaluation of veto points in isolation. But 
how might their combination and volume matter? On the one hand, whatever the merits 
of judicial review or any other veto point, they may diminish should a political system 
become overloaded with excessive veto points. This issue has been a point of 
disagreement amongst democracy-against-domination theorists. Ian Shapiro has taken 
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Pettit to task for embracing an “exceedingly long list” that weights outcomes toward “the 
status quo and those who have the resources to wait out opponents.”71 On the other hand, 
veto points may operate together to produce an effect that is more democratic than the 
sum of their parts. An optimistic take on the democratic effects of the veto point-laden 
American political system can be found in the recent work of Adrian Vermuele, in which 
he urges readers to consider the possibility that the various countermajoritarian features 
of the American constitutional order might lead to what he calls  “emergent democracy” 
via “offsetting failures of democracy” and the democratic distribution of undemocratic 
powers.
72
 
Both Shapiro’s and Vermuele’s warnings about interactive effects are worth 
keeping in mind as we evaluate veto points in isolation. Existing scholarship on veto 
points, however, suggests that Shapiro’s pessimism is more plausible than Vermuele’s 
optimism. While the various veto points in the American political system are distributed 
across different actors and interests, they are not distributed via a particularly democratic 
pattern. The sheer volume of veto points has empowered economic elites to effectively 
resist changes to the laws that would threaten their interests or curb their power, leading 
to what Hacker and Pierson call legislative drift:  powerful actors accommodating 
themselves to the legislative status quo while thwarting legislative change to match such 
innovations.
73
 In addition to this substantive worry, recent research suggests political 
systems with excessive veto points might erode democratic cultural values as well, as 
public opinion research shows that countries with veto point-laden systems tend to have a 
much higher degree of authoritarian attitudes about politics.
74
 So even if certain veto 
points have some democratic value, their cumulative effect may negate it. 
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Evaluating Judicial Review  
A thorough analysis of existing veto points’ democratic value is beyond our scope 
here, but we will offer a preliminary assessment of judicial review by our identified 
criteria. On the first criteria, judicial review would seem to stand up reasonably well. 
Unlike a legislator quietly killing a bill in committee, or placing a ‘hold’ on legislation, or 
a bureaucrat quietly issuing a directive to ‘de-prioritize’ the enforcement of a particular 
law, Supreme Court decisions are overtly and formally public, and subject to at least a 
modicum of popular scrutiny and debate. And even in comparison to other particularly 
public veto points, such as the presidential veto, the need to offer justification is 
formalized through legal decisions. However, this is not to suggest that judicial review 
perfectly meets these criteria. For one thing, there is nothing to prevent disingenuous or 
dishonest justifications.
75
 Jeremy Waldron has argued that defenders of judicial review 
often, and incorrectly, hold up judicial reasoning as fundamentally superior in quality 
compared to the low standards of public political debate.
76
 We agree with Waldron that 
the quality of judicial reasoning is often overstated.  However, the relevant comparison 
here is not to idealized exercises of public reasoning but to other veto points, many of 
which contain no public justification requirement. The justificatory requirements built 
into judicial review are still a net positive compared to other veto points on this 
criterion.
77
 
On the second criteria, judicial review seems to have one distinct advantage over 
legislative veto points. Specifically, the constant need of funding for re-election 
campaigns, as well as ties to interests groups representing private industry, provide the 
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possibility of private interests influencing the exercise of veto power. Consider, for 
example, the case of Congressman Billy Tauzin. Upon his retirement from Congress in 
2005 he immediately began a new job as a lobbyist for the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America. PhRMA outbid another major lobby, The Motion Picture 
Association of America, paying him an annual salary of approximately $2.5 million. 
While in Congress, Tauzin had occupied key positions on committees with a direct 
relevance to the interests of both these lobbies.
78
 The relative insulation from the 
channels of influence suggested by this story are much greater for judges than for 
legislators. The example of Tauzin demonstrates a common and widespread concern 
about private and powerful interests and the legislative process. Because judges need not 
stand for re-election and rarely have significant post-Court careers, the pathways through 
which their control of a key veto point could be used to advance private interests are 
limited compared to members of congress. This requires two caveats, however. First, 
there is no necessary link between direct financial gain and private interest. Judges, as 
Waldron reminds us, are people too. They have identities, irrational biases, and 
allegiances to groups both political and personal that could lead to undue private 
influence. Second, for politicians the threat of private influence is widely understood, and 
has resulted in a panoply of measures (such as ethics rules and campaign finance laws) to 
track and limit it. Judges may be subject to less scrutiny on this front.  
The third criteria might seem to have little bearing on the democratic quality of 
judicial review as a veto point. Constitutional courts are generally not tasked with 
prioritizing various laws, but with sorting them into three broad categories:  
constitutionally mandatory, constitutionally optional, and unconstitutional. Moreover, the 
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opportunity costs that might be associated with abandoning a particular path on 
constitutional grounds are frequently often outside of the purview of courts. But courts 
may exercise a great deal of discretion in the cases they decide to consider. The choice of 
cases that courts may choose to review reveals a great deal of discretion in whether to 
intervene in any particular constitutional controversy. Finally, it is possible that judicial 
review as a veto point has the potential to provide a forum for considering whether a 
particular “costly” form of rights protection is in fact fundamental and constitutional. For 
example, Brown v. Prata recently forced the state of California to make choices about the 
costs of rights protection with respect to rights violations associated with the 
overcrowding of California’s prison system.79 Courts can potentially elevate and identify 
a claim that a particular constitutional priority has been de-prioritized to the point that a 
rights violation can be identified, even if they are not in a position to offer a precise 
remedy to this problem. Previous scholars who emphasize judicial review’s deliberative 
value have demonstrated its potential on this criteria.
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The fourth criteria invites contrasts between different systems of organizing and 
empowering courts to engage in judicial review. An important democratic function of 
veto points is to provide avenues for contestation beyond and between elections. While 
not sufficient to meet the demand for contestatory institutional arrangements, judicial 
review can provide this possibility in a limited set of cases. Some regimes of judicial 
review (for example, in Hungary and India) allow for direct petition of the constitutional 
court on behalf of citizens, without first proceeding through a series of lower courts. In 
the Hungarian case in particular this has enhanced democratic participation.
81
 
Nevertheless, despite the high barriers, this remains an avenue for contestation of some 
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forms of domination. So, at a general level, judicial review appears to have the potential 
to serve as a relatively democratic veto point on this criteria. A number of previous 
scholars have emphasized judicial review’s positive democratic valence on participatory 
grounds.
82
   
The fifth democratic criteria for veto points require they must be comparatively 
likely to empower generally disempowered minorities. Obviously, judicial review’s 
likelihood to empower underrepresented and disempowered minorities will vary 
considerably, and it is difficult to reach general conclusions at a high level of abstraction. 
For Ran Hirschl, the case against judicial review hinges on the case that judicial review 
tends to further empower economic elites, who are over-represented among both judges 
and those who create and design systems of judicial review.
83
 However, in reply to some 
of his critics,
84
 Hirschl concedes that despite the further empowerment of economic 
elites, “women, ethnic minorities, gays and lesbians, and indigenous populations are 
likely to be far better off in the constitutionalization era.”85 Furthermore, Kim 
Scheppele’s research on constitutional courts in Hungary demonstrates that courts can 
and do intervene on behalf of the economically vulnerable in some cases.
86
 It would 
obviously be a mistake to view judicial review as a tool that reliably empowers 
disempowered minorities, of course, but there seems to be evidence that it may, at times, 
serve as a veto point for those who are unlikely to have access to other veto points—
particularly those groups who fall into a category comparable to Justice Stone’s “discrete 
and insular minorities.” Still, as a contestatory rather than legislative veto point, judicial 
review appears to have advantages on this point compared to veto points such as the 
filibuster.  
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Conclusion:  Towards an Institutional, Contextual, and Comparative Democratic 
Theory  
 We have argued that any democratic theory needs a general comparative theory of 
democratic veto points before we can meaningfully assess particular veto points like 
judicial review, and we have attempted a preliminary effort in this regard from the 
perspective of democracy-against-domination. The line of argument we pursue here 
effectively rules out a simple theoretical resolution to the question of judicial review’s 
democratic status. While this frustrates any effort to bring our analysis to a tidy 
conclusion, we can safely conclude that it is theoretically and empirically unsound to 
dismiss judicial review as anti-democratic solely on anti-majoritarian grounds, and that it 
appears it may have greater democratic value than many other common veto points. 
Beyond that, we conclude with a review of what we take to be the most important lessons 
for democratic theorists in light of this analysis. 
 First, democratic theory must be institutional and contextual in orientation. We 
cannot assess the democratic value of different veto points and institutional arrangements 
generally as a purely formal matter. We must rely to no small degree on the important 
work of scholars of institutions and regime politics. While it has begun to unravel, the 
longstanding consensus view amongst legal and democratic theorists that judicial review 
presented a uniquely countermajoritarian difficulty stood for far too long, even as our 
empirical colleagues painted a very different and far more complicated picture, in which 
legislatures and judges are as likely to work together as to be at odds, and judicial review 
rarely strayed much further from majoritarian positions than legislatures. The real-life 
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consequences of institutional political arrangements are as important as their formal 
structure, and the former cannot be simply derived from the latter. Perhaps the greatest 
democratic threat associated with judicial review comes not from unelected judges 
thwarting legislative majorities, but from the diffusion of power and responsibility 
through legislative deferrals, as Lovell amongst others have shown.
87
 But without 
attention to historical and institutional empirical scholarship on courts, the nature of the 
democratic challenge that judicial review presents would not have been noticed. 
 Attention to this scholarship gives some reason to doubt the wisdom of attempting 
to sort institutional arrangements and decision-making strategies into two discrete 
categories, majoritarian and nonmajoritarian. Once we recognize that any scheme of 
representation removes us from straightforward majoritarian decision-making as applied 
to citizens, two things become clear. First, the majoritarian nature of any particular 
decision-making strategy must be measured substantively as well as procedurally, as the 
latter does not directly determine the former. This makes determinative assessments of 
comparative majoritarianism a bit difficult to make. Second, since democracy has other 
associated values and demands beyond majoritarianism, it becomes one axis on which the 
democratic valence of the institutional arrangement can be measured, alongside the others 
identified here. 
 Second, democratic theory’s reflections and assessments of institutional 
arrangements requires a substantial comparative dimension. Such an approach further 
illustrates the difficulty of saying anything too definitive about judicial review’s (or other 
veto points’) democratic value in the abstract. In addition to the potentially different 
values of different forms of review, the way it interacts with the rest of the democratic 
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system may shape its democratic value. For example, the circumstances that surround 
judicial review’s creation may matter:  if it is created, as Ran Hirschl argues it was in 
Israel, New Zealand and elsewhere, to extend the political influence of the current ruling 
coalition well into the future, after they would have otherwise lost power its democratic 
value may not be as great, at least initially.
88
 Of course, once an institutional power such 
as judicial review is established, it can take on a life of its own beyond what its creators 
intended. The democratic value of judicial review may function differently in different 
political systems but also in different political cultures. Scheppele’s research on the 
democratic value of judicial review in Hungary in the 1990s hinges on the contestatory 
role they played in the absence of a robust contestatory civil society, alongside the 
weaknesses of elections in holding officials accountable, suggesting the weaknesses and 
fragility of Hungary’s democratic culture made judicial review all the more valuable.89 
The experience of judicial review in different institutional and cultural contexts will be 
crucial to understanding the circumstances and forms of review most (and least) likely to 
effectively promote democracy-against-domination. 
 In other words, a comparative context is absolutely crucial for making sense of 
the democratic value of judicial review and other veto points. The functioning of a 
particular veto point—whether its contestatory value turns out to be accessible only to 
elites or to groups at greater risk of domination, for example—cannot be determined in 
isolation, and may turn out to be idiosyncratic. In assessing the first few decades of the 
current renaissance in comparative law, Ran Hirschl laments the field’s “near-exclusive 
focus on a dozen liberal democracies” from which inferences about the functioning of 
courts are drawn.
90
 A similar worry surely could be expressed regarding democratic 
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theory’s assessment of institutional arrangements. Why, for example, did judicial review 
seem to make a significant contribution to Hungary’s democratization in the 1990s? Was 
there something about the context of post-communism that rendered it particularly 
valuable—and, given recent events, particularly fragile? Questions like this are unlikely 
to be answered by reflecting on only one, or a small group of democratic political 
systems. The growth and maturation of comparative constitutional studies as a field will 
be an ongoing valuable resource for democratic theory.  
 Despite judicial review’s evident limitations and drawbacks, we conclude that it 
appears to have some modest advantages over other veto points commonly found in 
contemporary political systems. But we are less committed to this conclusion than we are 
to the approach to applied democratic theory by which we have arrived at it. If further 
analysis of the effects of judicial review relative to other democratic veto points suggests 
a net negative democratic value, or if judicial review fails on additional democratic 
criteria we have not identified here, a re-evaluation of our conclusion would be 
appropriate. The democracy-against-domination approach focuses our attention on those 
members and groups in society most vulnerable to domination. Judicial review will 
almost certainly fail to provide a consistent and reliable path to successful contestation of 
dominating practices and structures and full democratic representation. But a democratic 
theory that takes power and institutions seriously cannot place its hope in a simple, single 
institutional fix to the problem of inequitable power relations, as no such “bulwark” can 
reliably exist.  
 
 
34 
 
Notes 
 
1 Bickel 1962. 
2 Graber 1993; Friedman 2005; Peretti, 2005; Tushnet 2005; Lemieux and Watkins 2009.  
3 Friedman 2010; Graber 2006; Lain 2012. 
4 See, e.g., Crowe 2012; Gillman 2002; Graber 1993; Lemieux and Lovell 2010; Lovell 
2003; Keck 2007; Sadurski 2008; Whittington 2009.  
5 On the complexity of Athenian democracy’s meanings, see Ober 2008. On the history 
of supermajority democratic practices, see Schwartzberg 2014. 
6 See, for example, Zurn 2007. 
7 On this approach in general Shapiro 2003; Shapiro 2012; Pettit 1997; Pettit 2012; 
Lovett and Pettit 2009. Considerations of judicial review’s democratic value with a focus 
on reducing domination can be found in Pettit 2004; Honohan 2009; Dawood 2008; 
Bellamy 2009.  
8 Freidman 2005, 158. 
9 Waldron 1999a, 114-115. 
10 Ibid., 118; emphasis original. 
11 Ibid., 23. 
12 An important critique of Waldron’s assumptions here is made by Alon Harel. He 
argues that “the judicial process itself—the process of determining the scope of our rights 
and their content is not oblivious to social values and hence that courts are more 
‘democratic’ than the opponents of judicial review believe.” Harel argues that the 
structure and focus of legislative and judicial decision-making are both fundamentally 
35 
 
 
important in the process of the political approximation of the will of the people. See 
Harel 2003, 276. See also Lever 2009. 
13 For the sake of argument we are granting Waldron’s assumption that judicial review 
functionally means that constitutional court judges do, in fact, have the “last word.” 
However, this is far too simplistic. First, it ignores the issue of complexities of court-
legislature relations suggested by recent scholarly literature on legislative deferrals. See 
Lovell 2003. Second, it ignores an important part of political reality—that legislatures 
(not to mention executives) have multiple means of continuing to pursue desired ends 
that have been rejected as unconstitutional. See Hiebert 2002; Peretti 2005, 133-6. 
14 Waldron 1999a, 299. 
15 Ibid., 285-289. 
16 To make the case that judicial review is in fact necessary for liberal democracy one 
would be forced to explain cases such as the United Kingdom, which by contemporary 
global standards certainly appears to be a functioning parliamentary liberal democracy 
without a court with the power of constitutional judicial review. 
17 On this point, see Tushnet 1988. 
18 Eisgruber 2002.  
19 Doherty and Pevnick 2014. Waldron discusses May’s theorem at Waldron 2006, 1388.  
20 Waldron 1999b. 
21 Waldron 1999a, 264. 
22 Ibid., 232.  
23 Eisgruber 2002, 38; Waldron 1999a, 299-300. 
24 Waldron 2006, 1361.  
36 
 
 
25 Klarman 2004.  
26 See, generally, Manfredi 2000.  
27 Waldron 2006, 1356.  
28 Waldron 2006, 1357,n.34. For arguments that legislative override provisions are 
important for democratic evaluation of judicial review, see Tushnet 2008; Hiebert 2006. 
29 Lovell and Lemieux 2006. 
30 Bickel 1962, 17. 
31 For an extensive assessment of the democratic value of various legislative procedures 
and rules that empower minorities, see Vermuele 2007, 85-114. 
32 We take this lesson from Waldron’s defense of legislative supremacy, in which his 
defense of legislative supremacy and his defense of the principle of “majority decision” 
blend together. See Waldron 1999b, 124-166. 
33 Doherty and Pevnick 2014. 
34 Bellamy 2007. 
35 Ibid., 223. 
36 Samuels and Snyder 2001. For an argument that greater degrees of malapportionment 
are linked to higher levels of inequality, see Horiuchi 2004. 
37 Przeworski 2010, 101. 
38 Kramer 2004. 
39 Tushnet 1999.   
40 See especially Balkin 2011. 
41 Tushnet 1999, 9-14. 
42 Schwartzberg 2014. 
37 
 
 
43 Ibid., 184. 
44 For further discussion of the latter see Lang 2007. 
45 Railton 1983, 156-158. 
46 See, for example, Kateb 1983, Harel 2003, and Dworkin 1996. 
47 Ely 1980. 
48 Den Otter 2009. 
49 Brettschneider 2007, 136-159. 
50 See, for example, Bellamy 2007, 42.  
51 Tsebelis 2002. Veto points come not just from legislative procedure, but from other 
political institutions as well. Under some arrangements bureaucracies can function as a 
veto point. 
52 See Pettit 1997, 2012; Shapiro 2003, 2012; Bellamy 2007; Keating 2011; Young 
1990; 2000.  
53 Saward 2003. 
54 Pettit 2000, 115. 
55 There is some controversy about the status of judicial review amongst democracy-
against-domination theorists. Pettit is clearly in favor of it, as evidenced by his two 
dimensional democratic theory. He also characterizes the empowerment of courts and 
bureaucracies as a way of “depoliticizing” democracy; see Pettit 2004. Richard Bellamy, 
on the other hand, argues that such empowerments cannot escape the realm of power and 
abandon democracy-against-domination’s grounding in political equality; see Bellamy 
2007, 2009. While we ultimately side with Pettit on the substance of the debate, we agree 
with Bellamy that Pettit’s dream of technocratic and apolitical judges and bureaucrats 
38 
 
 
who are somehow outside of politics isn’t plausible, and is not a promising foundation for 
a defense of judicial review. On the problems of Pettit’s “depoliticization” argument, see 
also Markell 2008; Urbinati, 2010; McCormick 2011, ch. 6; Shapiro 2012, 329-332. 
56 See Vermuele 2007, 97-98. 
57 Den Otter 2009. 
58 See Fisk and Chemerinsky 1997; Binder and Smith 1997. It is worth noting that even 
analysts who see the filibuster as more consistent with democratic values than we do are 
generally unwilling to defend secret holds and similar forms of obstruction—see e.g., 
Arenberg and Dove 2012, 173-175. 
59 For an argument that this is the primary criteria for evaluating and justifying collective 
decision-making procedures, see Elster 2013. 
60 Scheppele 2005, 2009. 
61 See, e.g., Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Kingdon 1995. 
62 Shapiro 2003, 3. 
63 Fisk and Chemerinsky 1997, 200.   
64 Although, of course, this veto point is built into the very structure of the Senate in the 
first place. The filibuster merely allows an even smaller minority to exercise it. 
65 Binder and Smith 1997, 159. 
66 Arenberg and Dove 2012. 
67 Waldron 2012. 
68 Ibid., 8-9. 
69 Vatter 2005. 
39 
 
 
70 Tushnet 2008 makes the case for the democratic superiority of weak review powers, 
as found in Canada, while Scheppele 2005 makes the case for the democratic superiority 
of the far more powerful Hungarian court. 
71 Shapiro 2012, 328. 
72 Vermuele 2011, 51-52. 
73 Hacker and Pierson 2011. 
74 Singh and Dunn 2013. 
75 And even where legal reasoning is disingenuous or in bad faith, the need to give 
reasons can sometimes mean that dubious case outcomes can, because of the necessity of 
needing to use attractive principles, potentially contribute to more positive future 
consequences. See Tushnet 2001. Even though this is not likely to occur in most cases of 
bad faith reasoning, there is democratic value in exposing bad faith political action. 
76 Waldron 1999a, 289-291. 
77 Of course, especially at lower levels courts do not always justify case outcomes with 
public reasoning, and other aspects of the process (such as decisions to accept or deny 
appeals) are often secret. Still, it is clear that courts have a clear comparative advantage 
in this respect. 
78 Fund 2004.  
79 Bower 2012. This decision is noteworthy for another reason: it demonstrates a case in 
which the victims of rights violations who are denied participation in democracy’s 
ordinary “democratic procedure” through felon disenfranchisement can still utilize this 
veto point to contest their own domination. 
80 Eisgruber 2001. 
40 
 
 
81 Scheppele 2005. On India see Epp 1998, 86. 
82 Peretti 1999; Kavenaugh 2003; Kyritsis 2006. 
83 Hirschl 2004. Hirschl’s analysis is limited to recently created systems of constitutional 
judicial review in South Africa, Canada, Israel, and New Zealand, although he identifies 
this as a broader global trend. 
84 McCain and Fleming 2005. 
85 Hirschl 2005, 895. 
86 Scheppele 2005. In the so-called “Bokros package” cases, the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court required the legislature to not cut certain social welfare benefits on 
constitutional grounds. The Russian Constitutional Court also issued a series of rulings 
enhancing and protecting employment and housing rights in the early 1990s, during the 
Courts’ relatively brief period of political power.  
87 Lovell 2003. 
88 Hirschl 2004. 
89 Scheppele 2005. 
90 Hirschl 2014, 16. 
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